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Economic recovery in Japan has been erratic
during the six years following surrender and has
accelerated greatly with the post-Korean boom in
world economic activity following June 1950. Not-
withstanding currently high levels of economic
activity, the Japanese people are facing the future
uncertain whether their economy can meet their
physical needs and provide rewarding economic
opportunities to an increasing population.
The form and organization of the Japanese
economy which evolves after the Peace Treaty
comes into force will depend upon resources avail-
able in Japan and changes in Japanese markets and
sources of supply occasioned by loss of the war. It
will also be conditioned by the impact of institu-
tions installed by the Occupation, and by the
various settlements imposed upon Japan by the
Peace Treaty and claims settlements still to be
negotiated.
The future of political and economic democracy
in Japan will depend in large part upon the
success with which satisfactory solutions are found
for the problems occasioned by the pressure of
an expanding population on limited resources.
Conditions conducive to economic and political
stability can be established by the sustained efforts
of the Japanese and their access to markets and
sources of raw materials on a competitive basis.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Japan's advancement to the rank of an indus-
trial power came in the 75 years following restora-
tion of the Meiji Emperor in 1868. Elimination
of local feudal governments and the opening of
Japan to external trade and the influence of West-
ern culture were followed by phenomenal economic
development. The structural changes accompany-
ing the restoration reduced the tax and debt obli-
gations of the rural population and provided
broader commercial and industrial opportunities
for the growing entrepreneurial classes. Rapid ex-
pansion of economic activity was made possible
by an abundant labor force, an economic organiza-
1 This article was prepared by Frank H. Golay under the
supervision of Arthur C. Bunce, Chief of the Far Eastern
Section of the Board's Division of International Finance.
tion adapted to a high rate of saving and invest-
ment, the rapid assimilation of foreign technology,
and the induction of foreign capital.
Japanese economic effort through the First World
War emphasized the development of consumer
goods industries, the expansion of external trading
facilities (both shipping and banking), and the
integration of a modern banking system capable
of meeting the requirements of industrial expan-
sion. Attention was also given to increasing agri-
cultural productivity and improving the standard
of living.
Following 1920, Japanese industrial development
was reorientated toward expanding industrial pro-
duction that required technological skills and
greater capital investment. Concurrently the con-
solidation of gains from earlier diplomatic and
military successes encouraged economic penetra-
tion of nearby areas and preparation for further
military ventures. In this period there was further
concentration of financial, industrial, and commer-
cial activities in powerful groups (the so-called
Zaibatsu), the expansionists ascended to political
power, and government financial institutions as-
sumed closer control over industrial and commer-
cial companies engaged in activities of national
interest. The Manchurian coup in 1931 was fol-
lowed by government policies aimed at developing
an economy capable of supporting further expan-
sionist ambitions with minimum dependence upon
sources of supply outside the control of Japan.
After opening hostilities with China in 1937, the
Japanese Government applied firm controls mobi-
lizing limited financial resources and forcibly di-
verting resources to selected economic activities.
After defeat in World War II, Japan faced an
uncertain future. Her economy, wholly orientated
to war, had to be converted to a peacetime basis.
The Japanese Empire had been reduced in area
by 53 per cent, and the loss of other areas pre-
viously occupied or subjected to control and ex-
ploitation further limited access to food and indus-
trial raw materials. Physical destruction within
Japan had been severe; approximately 40 per cent
of the built-up area of the 66 cities attacked by air
had been destroyed, and nearly 30 per cent of
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the entire urban population had lost their homes
and many of their possessions. The very existence
of the Japanese people was dependent upon im-
ported food provided by external aid.
At the time of surrender the Japanese popula-
tion totaled 72.4 million. The population density
of 491 per square mile was exceeded only in Java,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and England-Wales.
Since only 16 per cent of Japan proper was under
cultivation, the density per square mile of culti-
vated land was 3,109 persons. Repatriation of
Japan's overseas population, civilian and military,
together with a sharp increase in the birth rate,
added 6.2 million persons in the two years ending
September 30, 1947. While the Japanese birth rate
has declined substantially from the postwar peak
of 1947, there is increasing evidence that the birth
and the death rates are presently at levels which will
produce an annual increase of approximately 1.5 per
cent in the Japanese population, which totaled 84.3
million as of July 1951.
Notwithstanding intensive cultivation of available
land, Japan proper has never been self-sufficient in
food. In 1941, for instance, 20 per cent of the food
intake was obtained from overseas sources.
Because of the pressure of population on land
resources and the rising standard of living which
accompanied industrialization, the Japanese econ-
omy has long been extremely dependent on for-
eign trade. Prewar Japan was able to pay for
large imports of foodstuffs and industrial raw ma-
terials by exports of manufactures, receipts from
services, and by the return on investments in Em-
pire areas. Japan's colonial empire was intensively
developed to supply food products and as a result
the Japanese Empire was a net exporter of foods.
Trade with Empire areas, Korea, Formosa, Man-
churia, and China averaged 43 per cent of exports
and 33 per cent of imports of Japan proper in
1935-37.
RECOVERY DURING THE OCCUPATION
During the period of Occupation the implementa-
tion of divergent monetary and fiscal policies, to-
gether with the impact of changing international
price and demand conditions, produced three alter-
nating periods of inflation and stability in Japan.
Open inflation had not been severe during the
war inasmuch as diversion of resources to the
war effort had been accomplished by rigid mobili-
zation of the economy. In the governmental
vacuum immediately following the surrender, how-
ever, the Japanese Government disbursed huge
amounts of extraordinary military funds for dis-
missal pay, indemnities to military contractors, and
war damage claims. These expenditures, together
with reduced output in this period of indecision
and confusion, released an inflationary spiral which
was not controlled until 1949. Rapid, irregular
price inflation, stimulated by the slow recovery of
Japanese production, a cumbersome system of
multiple exchange rates, and inflationary monetary
and fiscal policies, continued during the first three
and a half years of the Occupation.
This initial period of inflation was followed by
a period of disinflation and stability as the Japanese
Government, at the direction of the Occupation
authorities, implemented the "Dodge" Stabiliza-
tion Program. Following the introduction of the
Stabilization Program in March 1949, the inflation
was halted, a single exchange rate was established,
and fiscal operations yielded a surplus without a
reduction of expenditures. In this period local


















NOTE.—Wholesale prices include "official" prices of com-
modities subject to control and free prices of decontrolled com-
modities. As of August 1951, 32 commodities subject to control
and 295 commodities not subject to control were included in the
price index.
Consumer prices represent average costs or "effective prices"
of 195 items in the urban standard of living. Price relatives
are weighted by expenditures in both controlled and free
markets as shown by a monthly survey of family income and
expenditures.
Source.—Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Jap-
anese Economic Statistics. Base period changed.
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hidden subsidies were drastically reduced or elimi-
nated, government participation in private eco-
nomic activity was severely restricted, and the
proliferation of controls over economic activity was
rapidly dismantled. Budgetary surpluses were suf-
ficiently large to retire a substantial portion of the
government debt, even after the use of tax revenues
to sterilize the surplus in the balance of interna-
tional payments. Additional debt was retired by
using yen counterpart funds arising from the sale
of United States aid imports.
After the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Jap-
anese prices rose sharply. In the 10 months fol-
lowing June 1950, the index of wholesale prices
rose by 53 per cent and the index of consumer
prices by 25 per cent, as shown in the chart. After
a brief period of inventory liquidation and rela-
tive price stability following April 1951, the various
price indices resumed their upward trend in August
1951. Post-Korean price increases reflected strong
demand for Japanese export commodities imple-
mented by the increased buying power of primary
producers in Asiatic countries and the "special pro-
curement" of supplies and services for the United
Nations forces in Korea, the higher world prices
paid for imports and the consequent increase in
Japanese costs and prices, and a sharp increase in
the Japanese currency issue and money supply.
The monetary expansion resulted from the large
balance of payments surplus in the last half of 1950
and the credit expansion encouraged by the Bank
of Japan to facilitate the financing of imports and
to stimulate deliveries of goods and services to the
United Nations forces.
Industrial production, virtually halted by the
surrender and the ensuing political and economic































































































1 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japanese Economic
Statistics. Base period changed.
Occupation. Progress was temporarily impeded
by indecision regarding the industrial capacity to
be permitted Japan and the reparations to be made
from industrial plant, as well as by the policy of
breaking up large industrial-financial combinations.
After hostilities began in Korea, industrial pro-
duction expanded rapidly and by March 1951 ex-
ceeded the levels attained in 1935-37, before the
invasion of China. By July 1951, production in
several lines approached levels attained in 1938-40,
when the munitions and equipment industries were
stimulated by intensive preparation for war.
Agricultural production, which had been little
disturbed by war and defeat, quickly recovered to
prewar levels. Large imports of fertilizer financed
by United States aid helped to restore productivity.
Incentives for increased production were created
by the land reform directed by the Occupation au-
thorities, and by the inflation which facilitated the
liquidation of farm indebtedness. Moreover, al-
though Japanese prices were officially controlled, a
substantial part of the agricultural output was
sold at black market prices.
Japanese foreign trade, virtually halted in the
closing months of the war by the Allied blockade,
revived slowly during the Occupation. The recov-
ery of trade was retarded by many factors, includ-
ing the small output of the Japanese economy,
the slow transition to private trade, the arbitrary
pricing of Japanese exports prior to the resumption
of private trade, the destruction and inactivity of
Japanese merchant shipping, the absence of over-
seas banking and commercial facilities, and the
political and economic instability in traditional
Asiatic markets for Japanese exports and imports.
The recovery of Japanese foreign trade was espe-
cially slow during 1949. By the first half of 1950
exports (at constant 1937 prices) averaged only 26
per cent of exports in 1937, while imports were
equivalent to 31 per cent of imports in 1937. Fol-
lowing the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Japa-
nese foreign trade expanded rapidly. Exports, re-
sponding to strong demand from abroad, expanded
from an average monthly rate of 54 million dollars
in the first half of 1950 to 83 million dollars in the
last half of 1950 and 110 million in the first half
of 1951. In addition, in the 12 months following
June 1950 deliveries of Japanese goods and services
to the United Nations Command were valued at
233 million dollars. These developments are shown
in the chart on the following page.
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FOREIGN TRADE OF JAPAN
Millions of U S. Dolla
250
Millions of US. Dollai
JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
1
[In millions of U. S. dollars]
NOTE.—Appropriations for United States aid terminated with
fiscal year 1950-51. Pipeline supplies contracted under the
1950-51 appropriation continued to arrive after June 30, 1951.
Sources.—Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
Japanese Economic Statistics, except that data for "special pro-
curement" exports are from Bank of Japan, Special Monthly
Economic Report.
Japanese imports, restricted by limited alloca-
tions of foreign exchange and by external supply
and price difficulties, declined in the third quarter
of 1950. In order to expand imports and restore
inventories depleted by the larger volume of ex-
ports, the Japanese Government sharply increased
foreign exchange allocations for the last quarter of
1950 and the first quarter of 1951, and the Bank
of Japan inaugurated a "usance bill" system under
which import credit was freely extended on fa-
vorable terms. Japanese imports, including United
States aid shipments, expanded sharply from a
monthly rate of 70 million dollars in the third
quarter of 1950 to 93 million in the fourth quarter.
They reached 173 million dollars in the first quar-
ter of 1951 and 208 million in the second quarter.
Despite the consistent excess of imports over
exports, which in the six years of the Occupation
totaled 2.0 billion dollars, Japanese net foreign
exchange reserves accumulated steadily and at the
end of June 1951 amounted to approximately 530
million dollars. The deficit on trade account was
more than offset through June 1950 by transfers of
United States aid, supplemented beginning in 1949
by a surplus in invisible receipts. In the 12 months
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1 For the period September 1945-June 1950, see Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers, International Transactions of Japan,
Aug. 8, 1950.
2 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japanese Economic
Statistics.
3 Bank of Japan, Foreign Exchange Statistics Monthly. "Invisi-
bles" include receipts from "special procurement" deliveries.
aid shipments were drastically reduced, the trade
deficit was almost matched by the surplus in in-
visible receipts largely attributable to "special pro-
curement" for the United Nations forces and to
expenditures by Occupation personnel in Japan.
POST-TREATY PROSPECTS
The sharp acceleration of all phases of Japanese
economic activity following June 1950 tends to
obscure the magnitude of the problems involved in
sustaining further improvement in production and
trade. The impetus derived from the strong de-
mand for Japanese exports of goods and services
has been crucial to the post-Korean recovery and
further expansion will be facilitated by continued
high levels of world economic activity.
Foreign trade. Notwithstanding the sharp im-
provement in Japanese trade following the start of
the war in Korea, trade in the first half of 1951 was
only 44 per cent of the 1937 volume—36 per cent
in the case of exports and 50 per cent in the case
of imports.
2
Following June 1950, the geographic structure
of Japanese imports tended to return to the prewar
pattern as imports of United States food grains and
2 Percentage for exports includes "special procurement" of
goods and services by the United Nations Command in Korea.
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cotton declined in importance in an expanding vol-
ume of trade. The proportion of imports received
from former Empire areas also declined sharply,
after having recovered steadily in the earlier post-
war period. The declining importance of imports
from the United States and former Empire areas
was offset by increases in imports from Central and
South America, the rest of Asia, Africa, and
Australasia.
Japan's exports to former Empire areas amounted
to 6 per cent of total exports in the first half of 1951
as compared with 43 per cent in 1935-37. Exports
to other Asian countries increased in relative im-
portance so that exports to all Asian countries
amounted to 55 per cent of total Japanese exports
The commodity pattern of trade after the war, as
in the prewar period, has included large imports of
foods and textile raw materials and exports of
manufactures, especially textiles and metal prod-
ucts. In the first half of 1951, imports of foods
and textile raw materials amounted to 67 per cent
of the value of Japanese imports as compared with
48 per cent in 1936 and 1938. During this period
exports of textiles and metal manufactures totaled
68 per cent of the value of exports as compared
with 58 per cent in 1936 and 1938. As a result of
the commodity pattern of raw material imports
and exports of manufactures, the average value
per ton of Japanese exports in the first half of 1951
was $310 as compared with $123 for imports.
1935-
1937 1947 1948 1949 1950
GEOGRAPHIC PATTERN OF JAPANESE TRADE
 a
[Percentage distribution of total value]





churia, China 32.7 1.5 4.3 5.4 9.6 4.8
OtherAsia 17.5 4.3 10.1 12.7 22 3 26.2
United States 25.1 91.9 64.7 64.2 44.1 33.2
Europe 10.2 2.2 3.3 7.6 4.2 7.0
Mexico, Central and
South America 3.1 12.5 1.5 6.9 12.8
Restofworld 11.4 0.1 5.1 8.6 12.9 16.0





























































































1 Trade of Japan proper for 1935-37 obtained from Foreign
Economic Administration, The Overseas Trade of Japan Proper,
October 1945. Postwar Japanese trade statistics obtained from
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japanese Economic
Statistics.
2 Includes United States aid shipments.
3 Excludes special procurement of goods and services for United
Nations forces in Korea in 1950 and 1951.
in the first half of 1951 as compared to 63 per cent
in 1935-37. In the first half of 1951, the volume
of exports to Indonesia, Hong Kong, Malaya, the
Philippines, and Thailand had reached approxi-
mately 80 per cent of 1937 levels; those to India,
Pakistan, and Burma were approximately 60 per
cent of the 1937 level.
COMMODITY PATTERN OF JAPANESE TRADE *
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1 Trade of Japan proper in 1936 and 1938 obtained from U. S.
Department of State, The Place of Foreign Trade in the Japanese
Economy, January 1946. Postwar Japanese trade statistics, Su-
preme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japanese Economic
Statistics.
2 Includes United States aid shipments.
3 Excludes "special procurement" of goods and services for
United Nations forces in Korea in 1950 and 1951.
Japan's experience in competing in the Asian
market as well as the complementary relationship
between the industrial economy of Japan and the
primary producing areas of Asia should facilitate
further expansion of trade in this direction. Im-
ports of foods and industrial raw materials from
Asian sources in the postwar period have been
limited by the recovery of production in these areas.
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Further expansion of the supply of these products
will depend not only upon economic development
in underdeveloped areas but upon further progress
toward economic and political stability in these
areas. The large-scale resumption of trade with
China and Manchuria, which in the past have
furnished food, iron ore, and coking coal to Japan,
will depend upon the conclusion of a settlement in
Korea and a general relaxation of tensions in the
Orient. Over the longer run, Japanese imports
from Asian sources may be restricted if the pres-
sure of population in these areas limits the diver-
sion of foods and industrial raw materials to export
markets.
Japan's exports to Asian markets since mid-1950
have reflected the increased incomes received in
those areas from the production of primary prod-
ucts including tin, rubber, and rice. While there
has been some slackening in the demand for these
commodities during 1951, the favorable terms at
which primary products exchange for manufactures
should be sustained in the near future.
Increased Japanese exports to primary producing
areas should be facilitated by the current develop-
ment plans of these areas, which provide for large
imports for development purposes to be financed
by grants, loans, and the release of blocked sterling
balances, as well as by current earnings of foreign
exchange. External assistance for development in
Asian areas should materialize in the Mutual Se-
curity Program (United States), lending by the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, Export-Import Bank (United States) loans,
the United Nations technical assistance programs,
the United Nations plan for relief and rehabilitation
in Korea, and the Colombo Plan for development
in the British Commonwealth areas of Southeast
Asia.
Japan's ability to capture a portion of the market
for investment goods in underdeveloped areas will
depend not only upon supply conditions in Japan
(prices, delivery dates, and service) but also upon
the duration of the present tight supply of these
goods in the United States and Western Europe.
To the extent that non-Asian participation in
Asiatic development is tied to expenditures within
the contributing country, Japan's exports of invest-
ment goods will tend to be limited.
As economic development progresses, the primary
producing areas may become increasingly self-
sufficient in some consumer goods and Japanese
exports of such goods may decline. However, the
increased real incomes which will be realized by
development should result in an expanded demand
for imports, including complex consumer goods
which are not presently part of the living standard
in underdeveloped countries. To the extent that
development plans provide for investment in the
production of industrial raw materials, the demand
for imports in underdeveloped areas should be
sustained by larger export earnings.
Economic development in Southeast Asia should
operate to Japan's advantage over the longer run
since the value added to raw materials processed
into investment type goods is greater than the
value added by processing textiles and other con-
sumer goods. Larger net receipts of foreign ex-
change would thus tend to accrue to Japan from
expanded exports of metal products and machinery.
Furthermore, if economic development increases
the output of industrial raw materials and food in
Southeast Asia, it will tend to prevent further
deterioration in the terms of trade at which Japan
exchanges manufactures for primary products.
Japan is committed by the Peace Treaty to enter
reparations negotiations with claimant countries.
The Treaty recommends that reparations be trans-
ferred by making available the skills and industry
of the Japanese people in manufacturing, salvaging,
and other services. Reparations in the form of
Japanese manufactures would require service and
maintenance and might develop further demand
for the product serviced, while reparations in the
form of technical assistance might lead to increased
demand for Japanese commodity exports.
Japan's postwar trade has been characterized by
a large deficit in trade with the United States. As
of June 30, 1951, the cumulative deficit totaled
1,863 million dollars, of which 165 million accumu-
lated following June 1950.
3 The postwar deficit in
Japan's trade with the United States has been
almost completely offset by aid shipments from the
United States, which, as of June 30, 1951, totaled
1,773 million dollars.
4
3 Exports include "special procurement" of Japanese goods
and services by the United Nations Command.
4 United States aid shipments procured from all sources,
including shipments financed by United States appropriations
for Japanese aid and the diversion of military supplies for
relief purposes, totaled 2,031 million dollars as of June 30,
1951.
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The termination of United States aid on June 30,
1951, has presented Japan with the fundamental
problem of reducing the imbalance in trade with
the United States. This problem will tend to
become increasingly critical in the event of a
settlement of the Korean conflict since more than
one-half of Japan's exports for United States dollars
following June 1950 were "special procurement"
deliveries to the United Nations Command.
The reorientation of Japan's trade toward other
sources of supply will be facilitated by the re-estab-
lishment of the network of Japanese commercial
and financial interests and the rebuilding of the
Japanese merchant marine.
A larger volume of Japanese trade with the ster-
ling area may result from the new financial agree-
ment of September 1, 1951 between Japan and the
United Kingdom. The previous agreement pro-
vided that Japan's holdings of sterling in excess of
17 million pounds were fully convertible into
dollars. Because of this convertibility provision,
imports into sterling area countries from Japan
were considered to be hard currency imports and
were subject to sterling area exchange controls on
such imports. The new agreement provides that
Japan's holdings of sterling are inconvertible into
dollars. During the postwar period Japan has
tended to accumulate sterling balances. Under the
new agreement, exports to sterling area countries
may be limited by Japan's inability to obtain de-
sired amounts of imports with her sterling earnings
and by her unwillingness to accumulate additional
inconvertible sterling balances.
Another development which could materially
afreet Japanese trade in the future would be Japa-
nese accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. At the present time, countries partici-
pating in GATT are not required to grant Japan
the tariff reductions negotiated between members,
and most-favored-nation treatment is extended to
Japan on a voluntary basis. GATT membership
in the future would tend to assure Japan of access
to world markets on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Balance of payments. Japan's net foreign ex-
change reserves as of October 31, 1951 were
equivalent to 723 million dollars (597 million in
dollars and 45 million in pounds sterling). During
the last half of 1950 the persistent postwar trade
deficit was reversed and there was a small surplus
in visible trade. This trade surplus, together with
large invisible earnings and United States aid,
resulted in a surplus in external payments for this
period equivalent to approximately 300 million
dollars. In the first half of 1951 Japanese imports
expanded rapidly. The visible trade deficit was
only partly ofTset by net invisible receipts and
United States aid and a deficit was experienced dur-
ing the period. In recent months the trade deficit
has been more than offset by Japan's invisible earn-
ings and the current account surplus in external
payments averaged 48 million dollars monthly in
the four months following June 1951.
The impact of the termination of United States
aid on the balance of payments will be offset by
substantial dollar payments by the United States
Government to meet local currency costs of main-
taining United States forces in Japan under the
proposed Mutual Security Treaty. Since the ter-
mination of aid on June 30, 1951 the United States
has assumed a portion of the yen costs of maintain-
ing Occupation forces in Japan. Formerly these
costs were fully met out of Japanese budgetary
appropriations.
Settlement of the Korean conflict would tend to
increase dollar earnings from the expenditures of
United States military personnel if troops now in
Korea were sent to Japan, and the decline in earn-
ings from "special procurement" deliveries to
United Nations forces might be offset to some
extent by United Nations outlays for relief and
rehabilitation in Korea. With the recovery of
sovereignty and the expansion of Japanese commer-
cial services, increased foreign exchange earnings
can be expected from shipping and from insurance
and banking services.
Japan has joined several international organiza-
tions in the past year and has indicated interest in
membership in additional international bodies. If
Japan should become a member of the United
Nations and affiliated agencies she would be obli-
gated to pay a pro-rata share of the operating costs
of these agencies. Future Japanese membership in
the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development
would obligate Japan to transfer substantial amounts
of foreign exchange to these agencies in payment
of her capital subscription. In the longer run,
membership in the Fund and the Bank may give
Japan access to the lending resources of these in-
stitutions. Japan's accession to the International
Wheat Agreement in 1951 will tend to reduce the
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annual cost of wheat imports if wheat prices remain
at existing levels.
Finally, the Japanese balance of payments will be
affected by the settlement of external claims against
Japan, in particular the claims arising out of United
States aid to Japan, the liquidation of Japan's pre-
war bonded indebtedness, and reparations claims.
Post-Treaty financial claims settlements. Among
the claims pending against Japan is the United
States claim arising from postwar aid extended to
Japan. United States appropriations for Japanese
aid in the postwar period totaled 1.8 billion dollars.
Japan's prewar foreign exchange bonds include
67.6 million dollars of dollar bonds and 61.1 million
pounds of sterling bonds which, together with
accumulated interest since 1941, amount to an
external indebtedness equivalent to approximately
360 million dollars. Early negotiation for a settle-
ment of these claims, which Japan is obligated to
conclude under the terms of the Peace Treaty, may
result from Japanese interest in inducing foreign
investment and establishing external credit facilities.
The third important claim against Japan will
arise from reparations claims of countries in South-
east Asia. In the early postwar period some items
of industrial equipment were delivered to China,
the Philippines, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom, and Japanese overseas assets valued at
an estimated 3 billion dollars were transferred by
expropriation. The transfer of industrial equip-
ment was halted in the spring of 1949 and since
that time no reparations transfers have been made.
The Peace Treaty affirms Japan's liability for repara-
tions and commits Japan to negotiate settlements
of these claims.
Substantial transfers of foreign exchange will be
required to service the various external claims
acknowledged by Japan. The successful liquida-
tion of these claims will be facilitated by the willing-
ness of Japan's creditors to accept payment in ex-
ports of goods and services from Japan.
Fiscal problems. Since further expansion of Jap-
anese foreign trade will be of critical importance,
it is imperative that fiscal, monetary, and exchange
rate policies be implemented which will limit in-
creases in prices and thus help to maintain the com-
petitive position of Japanese exports.
Under the "Dodge" Stabilization Program in-
augurated in April 1949, the Japanese Government
has been in an unusually sound fiscal position.
Large budgetary surpluses and a substantial por-
tion of the yen proceeds from the sale of aid ship-
ments have been employed to retire government
debt. Between March 31, 1949 and June 30, 1951,
the internal debt of the Japanese Government was
reduced from 587 billion yen to 345 billion or by
41 per cent. The supplementary budget for the
current Japanese fiscal year (ending March 31,
1952), and also the general budget proposed for
1952-53, provide for moderate increases in both
receipts and expenditures.
A second important element in the Stabilization
Program has been the practice of sterilizing the
balance-of-payments surplus. Normally holdings
of foreign exchange are transferred by exporters
and other holders to the banking system in ex-
change for domestic currency (demand deposits or
currency), thereby tending to increase the money
supply. In Japan, the excess of foreign exchange
receipts over payments has been largely acquired
by the government (Foreign Exchange Control
Board) against yen appropriated out of budgetary
revenues. Appropriations totaling 120 billion yen
(333 million dollars) have been made for this pur-
pose in the three years ending March 31, 1952.
Responsibilities assumed by Japan under the
Peace Treaty will require heavy yen outlays and
tend to reduce budgetary surpluses in the future.
Japanese commitments under mutual security ar-
rangements with the United States and the costs
of arming and maintaining an expanding Japanese
defense establishment may exceed the annual rate
of 90-110 billion yen formerly paid to cover the
costs of Occupation.
Yen appropriations will have to be made to
service and liquidate foreign claims, and the
magnitude of the obligations arising out of United
States aid, foreign currency bonds, and reparations
claims indicates that raising sufficient yen revenues
for these purposes may become a pressing problem.
Beginning in Japanese fiscal year 1951-52, in-
creasing revenues should be derived from customs
duties. The previous tariff law prescribed specific
tariff rates which had little relevance in the post-
war period because of the depreciation of the yen.
The new law imposes ad valorem rates and is
moderately protective.
Central and commercial banking problems. While
the initial impetus to post-Korean increases in
Japanese prices came from strong external demand
conditions, the higher price levels were quickly
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JAPANESE MONEY SUPPLY
End of Month
NOTE.—Deposits include current and ordinary deposits in all
Japanese banks except the Bank of Japan; they exclude time,
savings, notice, special, and government deposits.
Source.—Bank of Japan, Financial Statistics Monthly.
bolstered by a rapid increase in the money supply,
as shown in the chart.
The liquidity of the Japanese banking system has
declined steadily in the postwar period. Legal
reserves are not required of commercial banks
under existing banking legislation and Japanese
banks customarily hold minimum cash reserves.
While the negligible reserves of the banking system
magnify the power of the central bank to control
monetary and credit expansion, in practice the
close relationship between the lending policies of
the Bank of Japan and those of the banking system
has intensified political and economic pressure on
the Bank of Japan to maintain an expanding supply
of credit to commerce and industry.
In the 12 months following June 1950 commer-
cial bank borrowing from the Bank of Japan in-
creased by 55 billion yen (50 per cent) while the
cash holdings of banks plus their deposits in the
Bank of Japan increased by 3 billion yen to 25
billion. During this period the loans, discounts,
and securities of commercial banks increased by
459 billion yen (50.5 per cent) while deposit lia-
bilities increased by 407 billion yen (47 per cent).
As of June 30, 1951 bank borrowings from the
Bank of Japan amounted to 166 billion yen, six
and a half times their cash reserves and more
than double their capital and surplus accounts,
which totaled 72 billion yen. The ratio of cash
reserves (including deposits in the Bank of Japan)
to total deposit liabilities was only 2 per cent.
Commercial bank holdings of cash, deposits in the
Bank of Japan, and government securities amounted
to only 5 per cent of deposit liabilities as of June 30,
1951, as compared with 21 per cent at the beginning
of the Stabilization Program on April 1, 1949.
In the absence of legal reserve requirements, the
ultimate check on the credit expansion of the Jap-
anese banking system has been the drain of cur-
rency into circulation as prices and incomes rose.
During the stabilization period following March
1949, when a substantial portion of the govern-
ment debt was being retired, the Bank of Japan, in
order to avoid a curtailment in the currency circu-
lation (with a resulting multiple contraction of
bank credit), expanded its holdings of other earn-
ing assets to offset the decline in its holdings of
government debt. These assets have included both
loans to the financial system and, following Septem-
ber 1950, foreign exchange loans to importers
through the commercial banks. In the 27 months
following March 1949, Bank of Japan holdings of
government securities declined from 282 billion
yen to 172 billion while its other earning assets
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expanded sharply from 68 billion yen to 408 billion.
The ratio of its government debt holdings to its
other earning assets declined from 415 to 42 per
cent. During this period the corresponding ratio
for Japanese commercial banks declined from 17
to 2 per cent.
Production and capital formation. Further im-
provement in the Japanese living standard and ex-
ternal trade will depend upon the continued ex-
pansion of Japanese production. Following mid-
1950 the strong external demands for Japanese
exports stimulated increases in production which
permitted fuller use of available Japanese produc-
tive capacity than in the earlier postwar period.
In the earlier period production was handicapped
by a traditional paternalism under which retrench-
ment was not sought by reducing employment and
business losses were sustained in large part by bank
credit expansion.
Industrial production in the second quarter of
1951 was 51 per cent greater than in the corre-
sponding period of 1950 although employment in
mining and manufacturing declined by 6 per cent.
Since the average number of hours worked per
man in industry increased slightly (4.4 per cent),
the total number of man-hours required to produce
51 per cent more goods actually declined by 2
per cent.
Similarly, the relative increase in total wage pay-
ments was much less than the increase in physical
production. Cash wages per worker in industry
were 27 per cent greater in the second quarter of
1951 than in the second quarter of 1950. Since
wholesale prices averaged 53 per cent higher in the
second quarter of 1951 than in the same quarter
of 1950, the value (at wholesale prices) of Japanese
industrial production increased by approximately
130 per cent while total labor costs increased by
approximately 20 per cent.
Substantial expansion of output accompanied by
relatively smaller increases in the cost of production
has established a margin of considerable depth in
which Japanese prices can be reduced without re-
ducing profits below pre-Korean levels. While
industrial production has expanded at an unprece-
dented rate in 1950-51, the possibility of further
substantial increases in output with the present
labor force and industrial plant is less certain.
Electric power has been chronically in short supply
in the postwar period and problems of raw mate-
rial supply may become critical if output is to be
expanded substantially.
Further expansion of Japanese industrial pro-
duction will depend upon the capital accumulation
of the Japanese economy and the magnitude of
foreign loans and grants. Because of the low
levels of Japanese incomes in the postwar period,
both absolutely and in relation to earlier levels, per-
sonal and business savings have provided only a
minor portion of the investment funds required
by Japanese commerce and industry. The bulk of
these funds has been made available by inflationary
bank credit expansion. However, the high rates of
profit currently earned in Japanese industry and
trade should result in a significant increase in
business and personal savings.
Postwar foreign assistance to Japan has been
confined to expenditures for relief and rehabilita-
tion and has therefore made only an indirect con-
tribution to Japanese capital endowment. For
example, the United States Aid Counterpart Fund
(proceeds from sales of aid shipments) has been an
important source of investment funds for the ship-
building and public utilities industries in Japan.
When United States defense programs were being
reviewed and expanded following the outbreak of
hostilities in Korea, both the United States and
Japanese press frequently referred to "United
States-Japanese economic cooperation" and there
was much conjecture regarding the form this co-
operation would take. Among the alternatives
discussed have been the possibility of United States
loans to expand Japanese electric power capacity,
direct loans to Japanese industries to promote the
output of defense materials, and the shipment to
Japan of industrial raw materials to be processed
into defense equipment. The time required to de-
velop industrial capacity in Japan will undoubtedly
limit United States assistance of this nature. At
present United States employment of Japanese pro-
ductive capacity is limited to "special procurement"
of supplies in support of United Nations forces in
Korea and limited amounts of ofTshore procure-
ment for Mutual Security Administration programs
in Southeast Asia.
Private foreign investment in Japan has been at
a relatively low level in the postwar period, and
only in the year following June 1950 did the rate
exceed 5 million dollars yearly. The low rate of
private foreign investment has resulted not only
from unwillingness of foreign investors to risk
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outlays in Japan but also from legal obstacles to
foreign investment. Recent changes have been
proposed to liberalize existing legislation regulat-
ing foreign investment. If such changes are made,
increased amounts of private foreign investment
in Japan may follow.
CONCLUSIONS
Japan is distinguished from other "overpopu-
lated" areas of Asia by a relatively advanced state
of industrialization, a higher standard of living,
and by an economic and social organization
adapted to a high rate of capital formation. In-
dustrialization and the pressure of population have
made Japan extremely dependent on foreign trade.
Further recovery of Japanese trade will depend not
only upon continued expansion in Japanese pro-
duction, but upon the implementation of fiscal,
credit, and exchange rate policies which will main-
tain the competitive position of Japanese exports.
Japanese prices increased rapidly following mid-
1950 and after a brief period of stabilization in the
summer of 1951 resumed their increase although
at a reduced rate. While the initial impetus to
these price increases came from changes in external
price and demand conditions, they were followed
by a comparable increase in the money supply and
in bank credit. It is not clear that the inflationary
pressures which retarded Japanese recovery prior
to the "Dodge" Stabilization Program may not
again hamper expansion in production and trade.
Short-run prospects of continued Japanese trade
expansion appear to be favorable. Current rearma-
ment plans and stockpiling should sustain effective
demand for Japanese exports in underdeveloped
Asian countries while continued hostilities in Korea
or subsequent rehabilitation plans for Korea should
provide Japan with an immediate market for ex-
ports of manufactures.
Over the longer run, the external position of
Japan will depend upon the maintenance of high
levels of economic activity and world trade. Cur-
rent plans for economic development in Asia, if
implemented by adequate external aid, will help
to sustain effective demand in this area. More
important, it should result in the development of
new sources of food and industrial raw materials
to replace Chinese and Manchurian sources, which
may tend to become of diminishing importance to
Japanese import trade.
Evaluation of future economic developments in
Japan must take into account the resourcefulness
of the commercial and industrial interests in Japan.
The constant pleas for protection from Japanese
competition in other countries attest the ability of
Japan to penetrate foreign markets and to create
a demand for Japanese products. Recovery of
sovereignty and the rebuilding of the Japanese
merchant marine and external structure of banking
and commercial representation will facilitate Japan's
efforts to solve her economic problems.
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